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THE "PHYSICAL FACTS RULE":
TO SEEM IS TO BE?'
JEROME A. HOFFMANtt
"Description ... is not
the thing described ....
It is an artificial thing that exists,
In its own seeming, plainly visible ..
-from "Description Without Place"
by Wallace Stevens
1
It is not surprising that Wallace Stevens, a lawyer who was also a
gifted poet-philosopher, would put his finger upon the human weak-
ness that makes a concept like the "physical facts rule" difficult for
the human mind to control. Rarely is the thing which we refer to as a
"physical fact" itself actually in court. It is there by description
only: description by oral testimony, description by diagram, descrip-
tion by photograph, etc. Yet such are the workings of the human
mind that description becomes reality. Perhaps unconsciously we will
it so, because we would rather have some "reality" to cling to than
admit to ourselves that we will never really know what the reality
was-than admit to ourselves that we are adjudging on the basis of
probabilities merely the rights and fortunes of our fellow human
beings. The description given us by our witness carries us along and,
in our minds, itself becomes the thing described. Even knowing as we
do that avowedly fictitious descriptions carry us along in the same
way every time we read a novel or see a play, we nonetheless fail-
often quite willingly-to test or question the quality of the descrip-
tion upon which we build judgments affecting the rights of people.
Let us begin with a self-evident proposition. A party who has
adduced evidence tending to show the existence of a certain fact
cannot then prevent the submission or consideration of evidence
tending to show the nonexistence of that fact with the argument that
the evidence of nonexistence is incredible because it contradicts the
existence of the very fact at issue. Stated in this way, would anyone
disagree?
But the "physical facts rule" works powerful magic. We need only
tit was Professors Field and Kaplan who caused me to stop and think about the "physicalfacts rule." See Field and Kaplan, Materials for a Basic Course in Civil Procedure 492 (2d
temp. ed. 1968). My thanks also to Professor Malcolm Sharp, whose lifelong calling it has
been to stir minds.
ftAssociate Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of Law.
1. Stevens, The Collected Poems of Wallace Stevens 339-46 (1968). Stevens was a
full-time lawyer and business executive who also found the time to become a poets' poet.
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replace the word "fact" wherever it appears in our initial proposition
with the abracadabra "physical facts" and we somehow transport the
proposition from the realm of the self-evident. Adroit counsel do, in
practice, adduce evidence tending to show the existence of certain
"physical facts" and then successfully prevent the submission or con-
sideration of evidence tending to show the nonexistence of those
"physical facts" with the argument that the evidence of nonexistence
is incredible because it contradicts "the physical facts," that is, the
very facts at issue.
A recent New Mexico case, Bolen v. Rio Rancho Estates,2 will
serve as an example. Plaintiff put on testimony tending to show that
defendant's fence blocked plaintiff's decedent's view of the truck
which was approaching the fatal intersection at right angles. Defen-
dant put on evidence tending to show that his fence did not block
the view. Defendant subsequently argued that he was entitled to a
directed verdict because the plaintiff's evidence was incredible-
contradicting as it did the "physical fact" that defendant's fence did
not block the view. The New Mexico Court of Appeals agreed. This
iteself would seem incredible if we were not aware by previous ex-
perience that, on occasion, the "physical facts rule" works wonders.3
To break the charm which the "physical facts rule" occasionally
works, even on well-disciplined minds, I propose first to say some
negative things about it and then to suggest a formula restatement of
it which hopefully will transform it from talisman to effective pro-
cedural tool.
First to the negative things: The "physical facts rule" is not a rule
at all, but merely an entanglement of two distinguishable and equally
unremarkable applications of the law of judicial notice. Evidence
intended to contradict judicially known attributes of physical en-
tities should not be admitted or considered. Likewise, evidence in-
tended to contradict judicially known scientific principles, laws of
nature, or matters of common knowledge should not be admitted or
considered.4 To lump these applications together and call them a
rule vests them with unwarranted stature and discourages analysis.
2. 81 N.M. 307, 466 P.2d 873 (Ct. App. 1970).
3. In fairness to the Court, it must be said that its stated ground for decision looks bad
more obviously on this oversimplified statement of the case than it will later when we add
the details. I hope to persuade you, however, that, with every possible complicating detail
considered, the stated ground for decision is just as bad, even if less obviously.
4. Even these simplified statements are valid only in those jurisdictions where judicial
notice of a proposition forecloses counsel from disputing by formal evidence the truth of
the fact noticed. See McCormick, Law of Evidence 710-11 (1954). In those jurisdictions in
which judicial notice does not foreclose further dispute, the co-existence of a "physical facts
rule" very arguably makes no sense at all. I have found no authority putting New Mexico
explicitly in either category, but New Mexico's recognition of the "physical facts rule" puts
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Judicial opinions abound with indiscriminate references to "phys-
ical facts," "physical laws," "scientific principles," and "laws of
nature."' Furthermore, these marks of finality have attracted to
themselves adjectives that ring with commensurate finality. Why
should a jury be allowed to decide against the "undisputed" 6 phys-
ical facts? What counsel would dare dispute "indisputable" 7 physical
facts? It's vice enough, of course, that the incantation of formulas
often forecloses effective consideration of the specific issue at hand,
but the vice is compounded when-as is too often the case-"undis-
puted" and "indisputable" are used as if they also were interchange-
able. In any useful formulation of the "physical facts rule," they are
not.
Then to the restatement: Courts and commentators have shown a
vaguely focused awareness that the "rule" is a hybrid with a
tendency to get out of hand, but their attempts to limit and define
have not set it apart in any useful detail. If we are unwilling to
remove the "physical facts rule" from the working terminology of
trial and appellate practice, or if we are unwilling to look upon it as
two rules-a "physical facts rule" and a "scientific principles rule,"
we should at least reconsider and restate it in terms which recognize
its composite nature, make explicit the several discrete steps neces-
sary to its proper application, and minimize its capacity to
mesmerize. These requirements are met, I believe, by the following
restatement: 8
The operation of the physical facts rule justifies the entry of a
summary judgment or the direction of a verdict against the pro-
her by logical implication with those jurisdictions in which judicial notice has conclusive
effect.
5. For cases illustrating this statement and the statements of the next paragraph, see
principally West Digest: Trial 139(1); Evidence 588. For an additional smattering of relevant
cases see West Digest: Evidence 4, 5(2), 7, 589, 595; Appeal & Error 991, 1003; Railroads
348 (2,8), 350(17); Street Railroads 99(12).
6. Or "uncontradicted" or "uncontested."
7. Or "uncontradictable" or "incontestable."
8. The "rule" is stated here in terms that make it directly applicable to the determination
of motions for summary judgment, directed verdict, and judgment notwithstanding the
verdict. With some modification, the rule is also applicable to the determination of
demurrers, 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, and motions for judgment on the pleadings. See,
e.g., Morgan, Judicial Notice, 57 Harv. L. Rev. 269, 273 and n.7 (1944) citing Commis-
sioners v. Prudden & Co., 180 N.C. 496, 105 S.E. 7 (1920). Applying the Class 2 part of the
rule to pleadings, however, raises some questions that I would like to think about some
more. For that reason, I postpone to another time any statement of the rule as it applies to
pleadings or any statement of the rule in universal terms.
It is possible that this statement of the "rule" is reducible to terms which would render
the distinction made therein illusory at another level of discourse. But to reduce the state-
ment to that level would make it useless as a tool for legal analysis, even though to do so
might make it more esthetic mathematically or philosophically.
January 19721
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ponent of a cause or defense only where the sole evidence, not
otherwise discounted, upon an essential element of the proponent's
cause or defense is:
[Class 1] evidence that an entity known directly to the senses and of
established identity in the case has an attribute which it is judicially
known not to have;
[Class 2A] evidence of a condition, fact, or event which, by the
application of a certain judicially known principle of science or law
of nature or a combination of such principles, could not have been
the antecedent of a consequent condition, fact, or event established
in the case; or
[Class 2B] evidence of a consequent condition, fact, or event dif-
ferent from that required by the application of a certain judicially
known principle of science or law of nature, or a combination of
such principles, to antecedent or surrounding circumstances estab-
lished in the case.
An entity known directly to the senses under Class 1 is established
in the case if its existence and identity
1) have been judicially noticed;
2) have been judicially or evidentially admitted;
3) are undisputed in the evidence; or
4) are so certain by the evidence that the court could justifiably
direct a verdict on the issue, standing alone, of its existence and
identity.
A condition, fact, event, or circumstance under Class 2 is estab-
lished in the case if
1) it has been judicially noticed; or
2) it has been judicially or evidentially admitted.
CLASS 1 (THE "PHYSICAL FACTS" RULE)
The formulation of Class 1 contemplates the manipulation of
three elements: (1) a proposition of fact that must be judicially
noticeable; (2) a proposition of fact that must be at least so certain
by the evidence that the court could justifiably direct a finding on it
standing alone; and, (3) the evidentiary assertion the credibility of
which is to be tested. The process by which these three statements
are resolved to an answer about credibility is most usefully likened
to the conditional argument of logic. The court can be said to draw a
conclusion from the factual premises of a conditional argument and
then to compare that conclusion to the testimony to be evaluated.
The proposition in the major premise must be judicially noticeable.
To be so noticed, it must be indisputable. The proposition in the
minor premise need not be indisputable. Typically, it will state an
adjudicative fact which is known to the court only by the concession
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of the parties or by the testimony of witnesses. The coincidence of
this adjudicative fact in the transaction or occurrence out of which
the lawsuit arose will have been fortuitous and in no way dictated by
the nature of the universe.9 Before the court may use this proposi-
tion as its minor premise, it must determine that the proposition is
"established in the case." The most popular way to justify this deter-
mination in the cases has been to *say that the proposition is undis-
puted.
In summary, the court must (1) identify the major premise and
determine that it is judicially noticeable (that is, indisputable), (2)
identify the minor premise and determine that it is established in the
case (which determination will usually and allowably be evidenced
by a statement that the proposition is undisputed), (3) deduce the
correct conclusion from the premises, and (4) compare that con-
clusion to the evidence to be evaluated.
Now we need a Class 1 case to test the formula.
I have found no New Mexico case that falls in Class 1, but a good
example of that class of cases is Cameron v. Goree, 10 an automobile
negligence action in which plaintiff had judgment on a jury verdict.
The Supreme Court of Oregon reversed and ordered that a nonsuit be
entered for the defendant. The testimony upon which plaintiff relied
to prove defendant's negligence tended by necessary inference to
show that just prior to the accident defendant's car, a 1941
Chevrolet, was travelling at somewhere between 204 and 318 miles
per hour.' " The court said: "We think that people of average in-
telligence know that automobiles such as the one which the appellant
drove cannot travel 200 miles per hour."' 2 It then invoked and
discussed the "incontrovertible physical facts rule," concluding that
"every deduction which can be drawn from the data given by Mr.
LaValley attributes to the appellant's car a speed which is palpablyimpossible .... ,,
Thus, we can state Cameron v. Goree in terms of the rule as
follows: The sole evidence (not eliminated on other grounds) upon
an essential element of plaintiff's case (defendant's negligence) was
testimony (which necessarily implied) that an entity known directly
to the senses (defendant's 1941 Chevrolet) had a capability (speeds
of 204 to 318 miles per hour) which it was judicially known not to
9. Still it is possible for the proposition in the minor premise to be judicially noticeable.
Therefore, I have let "judicial notice" remain as one of four ways in which the proposition
may be "established in the case."
10. 182 Ore. 581, 189 P.2d 596 (1948).
11. Id., 189 P.2d at 603-04.
12. Id., 189 P.2d at 603.
13. Id, 189 P.2d at 604.
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have.' 4 We can also state it as a conditional argument: If defendant's
car was a 1941 Chevrolet, then defendant's car could not go 200
miles per hour. Defendant's car was a 1941 Chevrolet. Therefore,
defendant's car could not go 200 miles per hour.
The proposition that a 1941 Chevrolet cannot go 200 miles an
hour may not inhere in the nature of the universe, but based upon
what people of average intelligence and information know about the
characteristics and capabilities of 1941 Chevrolets, and in the
absence of proof that this is not the kind of 1941 Chevrolet that
people of average intelligence and information know about, we can
justifiably view it as indisputable, and hence, judicially noticeable.
Is the minor premise that defendant's vehicle was a 1941
Chevrolet disputable? Yes, it is, notwithstanding the "fact" that a
1941 Chevrolet is unmistakably "physical" in appearance. It may
well be that testimony that the car was not a 1941 Chevrolet would
be met with disdain by persons who had been at the scene. But the
jury was not at the scene. We are concerned only with what the jury
might allowably "know." There's nothing in the nature of the uni-
verse yet known to man which requires that one of the vehicles
participating in the occurrence otherwise being described to the jury
be a 1941 Chevrolet. We must look at the "physical fact" from the
jury's point of view, not from that of the witness. Any confusion
with the rule is caused by shifting one's point of view from the jury
box to the scene of the event.
Was the minor premise established, i.e., undisputed? We cannot
really tell from the report. The court treated it as if it were,' 5 and
we can only say that it is the kind of fact that we would expect the
parties to the usual case to concede. If it truly was undisputed, then
Cameron v. Goree illustrates the correct application of the physical
facts rule to a Class 1 case.
CLASS 2 (THE "SCIENTIFIC PRINCIPLES" RULE)
A condition, fact, event, or circumstance under Class 2 qualifies as
"established in the case" only if it has been judicially noticed or
judicially or evidentially admitted. I admit that any concession to the
indiscriminate language of the cases would require us to include the
other two means of qualification as well (that is: "undisputed in the
evidence" and "so certain by the evidence that the court could jus-
tifiably direct a verdict upon it [the condition, etc.] standing
14. "Courts take judicial notice of facts which form part of the common knowledge of
people who possess average intelligence." Id., 189 P.2d at 603.
15. Id., 189 P.2d at 603.
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alone"). But if we include them here, we are left with only the
illusion of a rule for Class 2 cases.
Consider the amazing thought process we must endorse if we are
to accept the "undisputed-in-the-evidence" qualification: "We must
disregard this evidence of fact A because it contradicts uncon-
tradicted (undisputed) evidence of non-A." If the evidence of A
contradicts the evidence of non-A, then the evidence of non-A is not
undisputed. If the evidence of A does not contradict the evidence of
non-A, then the "scientific principles" branch of the "physical facts
rule" does not apply at all.
The conclusion must be that courts which talk of "undisputed"
physical facts when discussing cases which fall within the "scientific
principles" branch of the "physical facts rule" commit an em-
barrasingly fundamental transgression against straight thinking,
unless they mean to say that a party must contradict evidence of
physical circumstances directly and expressly (that is: circumstantial
contradiction will not suffice) or have such circumstances taken as
established against him. If that is what they mean, the proposition
should be explicitly stated and explicitly justified.
Psychologically, we are all vulnerable, I suppose, to unarticulated
and unexamined feelings about matters of proof. There is the feeling
that testimony about "physical facts," even if not verified, is at least
verifiable. We take the scientist's word when he tells us that a certain
experiment produces a certain result, because it is unlikely (we be-
lieve) he would lie about something that can so easily be checked
against him by repeating the experiment. Similarly, we accept testi-
mony about the identity of a vehicle or the existence of damage or
skidmarks because we believe it unlikely that a witness would
misstate his perception when the object of that perception was or
still is accessible to others. Furthermore, we believe, if the opponent
could honestly dispute directly proponent's testimony about some-
thing so accessible, so verifiable, as "physical facts," he certainly
would do so. As Professor McCormick has said in another context,
"This notion . . . is an expression of feeling rather than logic but it is
an emotion so universal that it may stand for a reason."' 6
True, it may so stand, and has probably so stood. But it should
not. There are several explanations for an opponent's failure to con-
tradict directly the existence of alleged "physical facts." For
example, it is probably true much more often than not that the
"physical facts" surrounding an automobile accident do not remain
accessible and verifiable for longer than a few hours after the acci-
16. McCormick, Law of Evidence 503 (1954), discussing the "notion that it does not lie
in the opponent's mouth to question the trustworthiness of his own declarations."
January 1972]
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dent. In Elzig v. Gudwangen, ' as an instance, the dual wheel tracks
allegedly made by defendant's truck on the soft shoulder of the
highway, if ever they were there, were doubtless obliterated long
before plaintiff's counsel ever came into the case. To defendant's
contention that these memories of tire tracks were "physical facts
which had been conclusively established."' '8 the Eighth Circuit
Court correctly replied:
We think that the evidence in this case as to the wheel track of the
Elzig truck on the west shoulder of the highway was not in a broad
sense, uncontradicted evidence, and was not the kind of evidence
which could be accepted blindly and without regard to the credibil-
ity of the witnesses who gave it and the weight which should be
accorded to it. The wheel track had ceased to exist shortly after the
happening of the accident. Its existence at the time of the collision
was not a fact easily disproved.. .. 1 9
[T] he evidence as to the wheel track of the Elzig truck on the
west shoulder of the road, while not expressly contradicted by any
evidence to the contrary upon that point, is inferentially disputed by
the testimony of the two young women in the Daniel car....
Thus, at the very most, direct contradiction of testimony tending
to show the existence of certain "physical facts" could only be re-
quired when direct contradiction is still possible. And even that
limited application of a direct-contradiction-required rule would
serve too often as a trap for slow moving or slow thinking counsel.
The rule should be that circumstantial contradiction is sufficient
contradiction.21
Consider also the reasoning required of us if we are to accept the
"so-certain-by-the-evidence" qualification for Class 2 cases. That is:
Why must we disregard this evidence of fact A? Because it contra-
dicts not-A, which is "so certain by the evidence." How can we say
not-A is "so certain by the evidence" in the face of this evidence of
A? Because this evidence of A is not substantial evidence. Why is this
evidence of A not substantial evidence? At this point, we have (as the
17. 91 F.2d 434 (8th Cir. 1937).
18. Id. at 439.
19. Id. at 443.
20. Id. at 444.
21. Wisehart v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 80 N.M. 251, 453 P.2d 771 (Ct. App.
1969), cert. denied, 80 N.M. 234, 453 P.2d 597 (1969). With what flexibility and with what
exceptions the rule should be applied must be left to another time.
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story goes) one of two choices. We may say, "Because it contradicts
not-A, which is 'so certain by the evidence'," but that would lock us
back into our circular argument in perpetual futility. Or we may look
outside our rule for help. If we do that, of course, we have used some
other (probably unarticulated) set of premises to bail us out-not
those which underlie the "physical facts rule."
The rule for Class 2 cases also contemplates the manipulation of
three statements. The process required might perhaps also be stated
superficially in the form of a syllogism or a conditional argument,
but to do so would conceal more than it would reveal. The equation
is (or is most like) the process required for cases of Class 2.
The simplest form of statement for Class 2 is an equation with a
two-term statement on the left and a one-term statement on the right
(our "consequent condition, fact, or event"). One of the two terms
on the left is a constant; this, of course, is the proposition which
must be judicially noticeable. The other term on the left (our
"antecedent or surrounding circumstances") and the single term on
the right are variables; that is, there is nothing in the nature of the
universe which informs the trier of their identity; before the trier is
told by witnesses what "facts" fill these blanks, the trier might
reasonably accept any one or combination of many alternatives. For
Class 2A cases, the variable term on the right is given. For Class 2B
cases, the variable term on the left is given.
To apply the rule correctly, the court must (1) determine that the
given term is "established in the case", (2) determine that the con-
stant term is indisputable, that is, judicially noticeable, (3) solve the
equation for the third term, and (4) compare the result to the evi-
dence to be evaluated. If the given term is not established in the case,
or if the constant term is not judicially noticeable, the evidence to be
evaluated should be sent to the trier of fact.
Again we need some cases to test our formulation.
A Class 2A example of the "physical facts rule" is Ortega v.
Koury,2 2 wherein the defendant was sued for the wrongful death of
plaintiff's 3 -year-old son. Defendant's northbound car concededly
struck the boy with its right headlight somewhere in the east or
northbound lane of the street. The trial court sitting without a jury
found for the defendant, but the New Mexico Supreme Court re-
versed and remanded to the trial court "with a direction that it set
aside the judgment, assess the plaintiffs damages, and enter
judgment in his favor for the amount thereof' 2 3 on the ground that
22. 55 N.M. 142, 227 P.2d 941 (1951).
23. Id. at 147, 227 P.2d at 944.
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"[tI he findings made by the court on the issue of negligence are not
supported by substantial evidence." 24
Defendant had testified "that he did not see the child that was
killed nor any other child on the street at or prior to the fatal
accident"2" and that the impact had occurred three to five feet from
the east line of the street. 2 6 This testimony would have supported
the theory (apparently not expressly adopted by the defendant) that
the boy had run quickly into the street from the east side. The
supreme court rejected this testimony (and, implicitly, the theory it
supported) as "so inherently improbable as to be unworthy of
belief.",2 7 The court said:
Physical facts and conditions may point so unerringly to the truth
as to leave no room for a contrary conclusion based on reason or
common sense, and under such circumstances the physical facts are
not affected by sworn testimony which in mere words conflicts with
them. When the surrounding facts and circumstances make the story
of a witness incredible, or when the testimony is inherently im-
probable, such evidence is not substantial. 28
The court was not clear about the "physical facts" upon which it
relied, nor about the specific testimony which it deemed con-
tradicted by those "physical facts," but the only evidence that tends
to contradict defendant's testimony with any logical plausibility is
that there was glass and blood on the pavement ten feet from the
east line of the street, or one-half foot from the center line.29
Let's apply our restated rule to the decision. First, we can state
the decision in terms of the rule as follows: The sole evidence upon
an essential element of Koury's defense (unavoidable accident) had
as a necessary link testimony of a fact (impact occurred three to five
feet from the east sideline of the street) which, by the application of
a combination of judicially known principles of physics (stated in lay
terms according to their effect: where a car collides at low speed
with a very small boy, impact debris will come to rest at the point of
impact or on a short extension through the point of impact of the
line of travel of the car), could not have been the antecedent of an
established consequent condition (there was glass and blood on the
pavement ten feet from the east sideline of the street).
24. Id. at 146, 227 P.2d at 944.
25. Id. at 144, 227 P.2d at 942.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 143-144, 227 P.2d at 942.
[Vol. 2
THE "PHYSICAL FACTS RULE"
The graphic statement of this equation might look something like
this:
"X" Constant Term Given Term
Where a car collides at
low speed with a very
small boy, impact debris glass and blood
unknown will come to rest at the on the pavement
point of X 0  point of impact or on a = ten feet from
impact short extension through the east sideline
the point of impact of of the street
the line of travel of
the car
Let's assume for the moment that our given term is "established"
and our constant term is "indisputable"; then, solve the equation for
the third term, the unknown point of impact. The answer will be
"impact ten feet from the east sideline of the street." By comparing
this result to the testimony to be evaluated ("impact three to five
feet from the east sideline of the street"), we would conclude that
the testimony to be evaluated could not be true.
Before the Supreme Court of New Mexico accepted that conclu-
sion as correct, however, it should have asked itself consciously (1)
whether the given term of the equation was established and (2)
whether the constant term was indisputable. If the answer to either
question was no, the court should not have directed judgment not-
withstanding the verdict.
Was the given term established?
It was not judicially noticed, nor could it have been. If we say it
was established because the investigating policeman so testified,3 1
we have employed a rule of decision that has nothing to do with the
physical facts rule. That is: the trier of fact is bound by the testi-
mony of an investigating policeman. We know that the Supreme
Court of New Mexico did not intend to adopt that rule. Heavily
30. As used here, the multiplication sign means only that the terms are to be employed
together by way of the process required by the principle or principles invoked; not that the
terms are literally to be multiplied together. Sometimes, however, the process required
would be simple multiplication. For example, in a case where such testimony would be
relevant, defendant testifies that he measured the circumference of Circle X and it was 3.14
yards around; plaintiff testifies that he stepped off the diameter of Circle X and it was 2
yards across. By applying a simple mathematical principle requiring only one-step multi-
plication, we can determine as a "physical fact" that one of the parties is mistaken. Un-
fortunately, the principle tells us nothing about which party is mistaken. Even more
unfortunately, some courts have thought that it does.
31. Ortega v. Koury, 55 N.M. 142, 144, 227 P.2d 941, 942 (1951).
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though the testimony of an investigating policeman may usually
weigh in the balance, the credibility of an investigating policeman is
not, by virtue of his official status or respected position, put beyond
question. Nor can we say his testimony must be accepted because it
was not contradicted. It was contradicted circumstantially by de-
fendant's testimony that the point of impact was from three to five
feet from the east sideline of the street.' 2 (Most of this paragraph, of
course, has served as further explicit demonstration that saying a
given term under Class 2 is "established in the case" because it is
"undisputed in the evidence" or "so certain by the evidence" is
saying nothing at all about the "physical facts rule.")
Under the restated rule, one permissible means of qualfication as
"established in the case" remains. Was the given term judicially or
evidentially admitted? The court said nothing about a judicial ad-
mission. In one part of his testimony, however, the defendant ap-
parently accepted as true the policeman's testimony that the glass
and blood were found ten feet from the curb. He attempted to
reconcile this evidence with his (the defendant's) testimony that im-
pact occurred three to five feet from the curb by applying his own
set of scientific principles to the facts.' ' Arguably then, the de-
fendant brought himself within the rules which allow a party's self-
disserving testimony to be held conclusive against him, that is, to be
treated as an evidential admission.3 4 His testimony as a whole
showed unequivocally (the argument goes) that he did not take issue
with the proposition that glass and blood were found ten feet from
the curb, but only with the plaintiff's contention that a certain infer-
ence had to be drawn from that fact. If we accept this argument (and
it is tenable), then the court did determine correctly (or could have,
had it considered the problem explicitly at all) that the given term of
our equation was "established in the case," because evidentially ad-
mitted.
If we accept this argument, we are led directly to the second
question the court had to resolve. Was the constant term of our
equation indisputable, i.e., judicially noticeable?
The combination of principles of physics which the court un-
consciously (but necessarily) applied as its constant term was a ques-
tionable subject for judicial notice. There is at least some support in
32. Id.
33. "Well, you take here now, when you hit a person, maybe the momentum of the car
dragged him to there, or maybe the shatter of the glass could fly 10 feet, or when you hit a
body or anything you hit, it isn't going to fall right where you hit it, it could have really
gone farther back." Id.
34. See McCormick, Law of Evidence 513-16 & n. 14 (1954).
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experience for the physical principle which the defendant urged for
the court's notice. 3 5 Courts generally have been reluctant to allow
formula reconstruction of events in accident cases involving moving
vehicles, because of the many unidentified, immeasurable, and un-
controllable variable forces which may come into play.3 6 There are
several relevant variables not accounted for in our equation, because
they were not established by the parties: At the instant of impact,
was the line of travel of defendant's car parallel to the east line of the
street or was it swerving? Was the little boy moving and, if so, how
fast and what was his line of travel? There are probably others;
without the help of a physicist, that's about all we can say. Perhaps
the court should not-without the help of a physicist-have
fashioned its own laws of physics for the occasion.
If Ortega v. Koury is wrong, it is the only erroneously decided
Class 2A case I have found in New Mexico.
3 7
We can now return to Bolen v. Rio Rancho Estates3 8 to illustrate
the misapplication of the physical facts rule to a Class 2B case.
Plaintiff's fourteen-year-old daughter (Elaine) was killed when the
motorbike she was riding collided at right angles at an intersection
with a truck driven by one Martin. Elaine was proceeding east on
19th Street; Martin was proceeding south on Grand Street. To see
each other as they approached the intersection, Martin and Elaine
had to look over (or through) a solid wooden fence four feet high
which ran around the corner lot owner's front yard. Plaintiff sued
Martin, of course, but also sued the corner lot owner (Defendant
Drum), the lumber man who built the fence (Defendant Shoffner),
and the area developer (Defendant Rio Rancho Estates), on the
theory that the fence obstructed visibility and endangered traffic and
that erection and maintenance of such a fence at the intersection was
35. "[W] hen you hit a body .... it isn't going to fall right where you hit it .. " Ortega
v. Koury 55 N.M. at 144, 227 P.2d at 942.
36. State ex rel. Los Lunas Hosp. & Trng. Sch. v. Montgomery, 78 N.M. 266, 430 P.2d
763 (1967); International Svc. Ins. Co. v. Ortiz, 75 N.M. 404,405 P.2d 408 (1965); Massey
v. Beacon Supply Co., 70 N.M. 149, 371 P.2d 798 (1962); Crocker v. Johnston, 43 N.M.
469, 95 P.2d 214 (1939). And see Cameron v. Goree, 182 Ore. 581, 189 P.2d 596, 606
(1948):
The damage wrought in some collisions appears to be freak and
capricious .... In all instances, however, the law of physics operates in-
discriminately and what appears to be novel damage in a particular case would
be readily understandable if all the circumstances were brought to light.
37. Correctly decided Class 2A cases are those New Mexico cases cited supra note 37,
plus Johnson v. Mercantile Ins. Co., 47 N.M. 47, 133 P.2d 708 (1943) and Larsen v. Bliss,
43 N.M. 265, 95 P.2d 214 (1939). Elzig v. Daniel, discussed supra notes 19-22, is also a
correctly decided Class 2A case.
38. 81 N.M. 307, 466 P.2d 873 (Ct. App. 1970).
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negligence which was a concurring proximate cause of the accident.
The trial court directed verdicts in favor of Defendants Shoffner
and Rio Rancho Estates. The jury returned verdicts in favor of De-
fendants Drum and Martin. The New Mexico Court of Appeals re-
versed and remanded as to Defendant Martin, but affirmed the trial
court as to the other three defendants. Directed verdicts in favor of
Defendants Shoffner3 9 and Rio Rancho Estates4  were proper (said
the court), and a verdict should have been directed for Defendant
Drum,4 1 because plaintiff had produced "neither evidence nor in-
ference that Elaine's view of Martin's pickup was obscured by the
fence. 42
Plaintiff did produce a witness who testified that he had to stand
up three or four inches on his motorbike (the very motorbike Elaine
had borrowed and ridden into the accident) to see over the fence and
that Elaine was quite a bit shorter than he was.4 3 But the court
dismissed his testimony as incredible under the "physical facts
rule",4 4 saying:
The motorcycle owner's testimony as to his own obscured vision
is inherently improbable because the undisputed physical facts show
his vision was not obscured .... The physical facts are that anyone
with an eye level four feet or higher above 19th Street could see the
cab of the pickup over the fence. 41
This ruling was erroneous, and holding it up to our restated rule
will show us why. First, we can verbalize it in terms of the rule as
follows: The sole evidence upon an essential element of plaintiff's
case against Defendants Drum, Shoffner, and Rio Rancho Estates
was testimony of a consequent condition (Elaine's view of Martin's
truck was obstructed by Drum's fence) different from that required
by the application of a certain judicially known principle of physics
(simply stated: light travels from object to eye or to camera lens in a
straight line) to purportedly established circumstances (a straight line
drawn from a point identical to Elaine's eye level at any relevant
location on 19th Street, to a point anywhere on the upper two feet
of Defendant Martin's truck at any relevant location on Grande
Street would not intersect Defendant Drum's fence at any point).
Once again, a more graphic form of equation might look like this:
39. Id. at 308, 466 P.2d at 874.
40. Id. at 312, 466 P.2d at 878.
41. Id. at 308, 466 P.2d at 874.
42. Id. at 309, 466 P.2d at 875.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 308-09, 466 P.2d at 874-75.
45. Id. at 309, 466 P.2d at 875.
[Vol. 2
THE "PHYSICAL FACTS RULE"
Given Term Constant Term X"
A straight line drawn
from a point identical
to Elaine's eye level
at any relevant location Was Elaine's
on 19th Street to a Light travels from view of Martin's
point anywhere on the x4 6  object to eye or truck obstructed
upper two feet of to camera lens in by Drum's fence?
Martin's truck at any a straight line
relevant location on
Grande Street would not
intersect Drum's fence
at any point
Assuming again for the moment that our given term is "estab-
lished" and our constant term is "indisputable," our solution for the
third term of the equation will be "Elaine's view of Martin's truck
was not obstructed4 " by Drum's fence." By comparing this solution
to the testimony to be evaluated ("Elaine's view of Martin's truck
was obstructed by Drum's fence"), we would again conclude that the
testimony to be evaluated could not be true.
But, once again, the court should not have drawn this conclusion
without first consciously determining (1) that the given term of the
equation was established and (2) that the constant term was in-
disputable.4" In this case, the term which must qualify as judicially
noticeable does so. It states a verifiable principle of physics which is
also common knowledge. By what token, on the other hand, did the
court consider its given term to be "established"?
The court said:
Photographs show that at a height four feet above the eastbound
46. Supra note 31.
47. This case necessarily stands for the proposition that partial obstruction is no obstruc-
tion, a proposition with which eye doctors, psychiatrists, camouflage experts, and traffic
safety experts would, I expect, take brisk exception. I suggest preliminarily that the
definition of visual obstruction implicit in the Court's decision should not be (or become)
the law.
48. Though the Court misapplied the rule, it stated the substance of the rule correctly:
The cases denying application of the rule have usually done so either
because the physical facts were not established .... or because the established
physical facts were such that conflicting oral testimony was not inherently
improbable.... Bolen v. Rio Rancho Estates, 81 N.M. 307, 309, 466 P.2d
873, 875 (Ct. App. 1970).
The "inherently improbable" formula has often been stated in the cases. By speaking in
terms of "inherent improbability," a court shows its vaguely articulated recognition that
there is a scientific or commonly known principle at work which operates with such
certainty that the court is willing to notice it judicially.
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lane of travel on 19th Street almost all of the cab of Martin's pickup
is visible above the fence .... Surveyed elevations of the two streets
and of the fence at its highest point show that at a height four feet
above 19th Street, the pickup, which was over six feet in height,
would always be visible over the fence.. . .It is undisputed that the
seat of a motorcycle 'just like' the one in the accident is 31 inches
above the ground. A 5 foot 2 inch female, seated erect on the
motorcycle, has an eye level 4 feet 7 inches above the ground. These
physical facts render inherently improbable the inference from the
motorcycle owner's testimony that Elaine's vision over the fence was
obscured because of her size .... 49
The court neglected to say that all of the "facts" which it recited,
and which it employed to nullify plaintiff's evidence, came to the
court's knowledge by way of defendants' witnesses5 0 or by way of
defendants' counsel. 5 ' What the court really meant when it held, by
implication, that these facts were "established" was that it believed
the testimony of defendants' witnesses and that it accepted
defendants' photographs and diagrams as authentic and accurate
representations of certain physical circumstances which could no
longer be verified by independent investigation.
In other words, the court thought and acted as it would have been
permissible for a jury to do in reaching a verdict on the evidence, and
not as a court must do in deciding on a motion for directed verdict.
For it was not "established" to the certainty required for directing a
verdict that Elaine Bolen could see Martin's truck over Drum's fence
just because the defendants produced a surveyor who testified (albeit
in the impressive language of trigonometry) that she could. Whether
or not this surveyor was mistaken or this survey was slanted should
have been for the jury to decide in light of all the evidence. It was
not "established" to the certainty required for directing a verdict
that Elaine Bolen could see Martin's truck over Drum's fence just
because the defendants produced a photograph which testified that
she could. Seeing may be believing, but seeing a picture requires us to
believe only that someone has indeed taken a picture of something.
Whoever first said, "one picture is worth a thousand words" said
nothing about any guarantee that the thousand words be truthful.
Every law library has a six-pound, 723-page book that illustrates with
photographs the many ingenious ways in which photographs can be
made to lie.5 2 Whether or not this photograph had been made to lie
49. Id.
50. Record, vol. 2, at 299-337, Bolen v. Rio Rancho Estates, 81 N.M. 307, 466 P.2d 873
(Ct. App. 1970).
51. Id. at 226; Answer Brief for Defendant Drum at 7.
52. Photographic Misrepresentation (M. Houts ed. 1964). In this case, little sleight-of-
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was for the jury to decide in light of all the evidence.' ' The picture
was definitely not the "physical fact" upon which the issue of
visibility turned.
What the court must have meant when it said that certain of these
facts were "undisputed" is that the plaintiff did not directly assail
the defendants' testimony on these points by counter testimony; for
certainly these "undisputed" facts were of logical necessity circum-
stantially disputed by plaintiff's witness.5" And, of course, it is clear
that circumstantial contradiction can suffice to put an opponent's
testimony in dispute.5"
In sum, the surrounding circumstances upon which the court
raised its "undisputed physical facts" were clearly not "established":
they were not judicially noticeable; they were not judicially ad-
mitted; they were circumstantially disputed by the testimony of
plaintiff's witness. Therefore, the court's conclusion was invalid
under the "physical facts rule" because one of the terms of the
equation by which the "physical facts rule" should have been applied
was invalid.' 6
CONCLUSION
Perhaps it is wrong to hold courts accountable for their judgments
on the substantiality of evidence. Perhaps what is needed in this era
of crowded calendars is a whole set of rules solid in sound but vague
in application which a judge can wield to terminate cases that seem
obvious to him. If so, then it is wrong to tinker with the "physical
facts rule." For the "physical facts rule," applied unanalytically, is
the weapon par excellence for cutting off a party's right to trial by
jury. Once the magic words are invoked, it often happens that no one
camera would have been required. The photographer might simply have taken the photo-
graphs at a height from the ground misleadingly greater than the four feet to which he
testified; or from a location on the ground different from the location on the street to
which he testified; or both. Whether he did or not should have been for the jury to decide.
53. Or if it was for the court, it was for reasons which have nothing to do with the
"physical facts rule."
54. Supra note 44 and accompanying text.
55. Wisehart v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 80 N.M. 251, 453 P.2d 771 (Ct. App.
1969), cert. denied, 80 N.M. 234, 453 P.2d 597 (1969). Supra note 22 and accompanying
text.
56. Correctly decided Class 2B cases in New Mexico are Alexander v. Cowart, 58 N.M.
395, 271 P.2d 1005 (1954), and Wisehart v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 80 N.M. 251,
453 P.2d 771 (Ct. App. 1969), cert. denied, 80 N.M. 234, 453 P.2d 597 (1969).
A very recent case, Sanchez v. Public Service Co.,_N.M.-., 487 P.2d 180 (Ct. App.
1971), which the Court erroneously purported to decide under the "physical facts rule,"
does not fall within the rule at all, because-as the factual issue was presented-there was no
legitimate question of judicial notice to be decided. As a straight-forward problem regarding
the burden of going forward with evidence, the case is interesting. Its true significance
should not be obscured by shrugging it off as a "physical facts" case.
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(including the party who invoked the words) is further able to per-
ceive that there is not a "physical fact" to be seen in the courtroom.
In the mind's eye, description has taken on substance and stands
there as the thing described. But to seem is not to be, nor to have
been. Although the photograph in court and the diagram drawn so
impressively by an expert witness seem to be the object in question,
neither is the thing purportedly described. It is still the duty of the
fact-finder to reconstruct the events as best it can from these "seem-
ings."
The fact-finder should not be relieved so casually of the important
and difficult responsibility that the uncritical invocation of the
"physical facts rule" allows. The proposals set forth should ensure
that this will not happen.
